

# Game Theory for Social Scientists

## *Briefing Session*

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# Outline

- 1 General information
  - Contact
  - Expectations
  - Module housekeeping
- 2 A brief introduction
- 3 Course assessment

# Contacts and affiliation

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
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# What are your expectations from the course?

## Class profile



# Module housekeeping

## Prerequisites

- working knowledge of mathematics (elementary calculus)
- predominantly 'logical' reasoning
- little 'social' reasoning

## Course structure

- Definitions and concepts (Kong)
- Simulations and workshops (Thilo)

## Course material

- [www.klein.co.uk/GameTheory](http://www.klein.co.uk/GameTheory)

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- 1 General information
- 2 A brief introduction
  - What is Game Theory?
  - An example: Guessing Game
- 3 Course assessment

# What is Game Theory?

## Definition

- “Game theory concerns the behaviour of decision makers whose decisions affect each other”  
– *New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics, 2008.*
- Umbrella theory for the rational side of social science
- Methodologies apply to all interactive situations, especially in economics, political sciences, social psychology, etc.

## Non-cooperative game theory

- **Question:** which actions do players choose?
- **What is modeled:** players, actions, payoffs
- **What is not modeled:** evolution of the game

# Example: Guessing game


## Guessing game

- Several people try to guess what  $2/3$  of the average of their guesses will be
- numbers are restricted to the real numbers in  $[0,100]$
- the winner is the one closest to  $2/3$  the average.


## Instructions

- Go to <http://veconlab.econ.virginia.edu/gg/>
- 'Login as Participant'
- select 'Initial Login for All Programs'
- enter session name: [tbkc1](#)
- enter your name and password [1234](#)
- follow instructions on the screen.

# Guessing game: Round 1



# Guessing game: Rounds 1 to 3



# Guessing game: Analysis

## Strategic reasoning

- What will other players do?
- What should I do in response?
- Each player *best responds* to the others: Nash equilibrium

## Solving the guessing game

- Suppose a player believes the average play will be  $X$
- Optimal strategy is to say closest integer to  $\frac{2}{3}X$
- $X \leq 100$ , so optimal strategy of any player has to be  $\leq 67$
- If  $X \leq 67$ , optimal strategy of any player has to be  $\leq \frac{2}{3}67$
- Iterating, the unique Nash equilibrium is for every player to announce 0!

## Guessing game: Analysis cont'd

- Look at a hypothetical world where all players are *rational*
- and where this is *common knowledge*.
- Under this “*common knowledge of rationality*” hypothesis, game theory makes two kinds of statements:

### positive statement

All players *will* play a certain number (Nash equilibrium).

### normative statement

All players *should* play this number.

## Guessing Game: Application



Keynesian beauty contest: Pick the most popular kitten!

“It is not a case of choosing those [faces] that, to the best of one’s judgment, are really the prettiest, nor even those that average opinion genuinely thinks the prettiest. We have reached the third degree where we devote our intelligences to anticipating what average opinion expects the average opinion to be. And there are some, I believe, who practice the fourth, fifth and higher degrees.”  
– John Maynard Keynes, *General Theory of Employment Interest and Money*, 1936.

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  - Group projects
  - Course outline
  - Next steps

# Group projects

## In a nutshell

- Groups of 2-3
- Focus on one of the generic games covered in course
- 3 milestones
  - 1 Short research proposal (1-2 pages)
  - 2 Group presentation (20 min)
  - 3 Optional: conduct experiment and document results in a short essay (6 pages)
- For details see the course website.

# Course outline

## Agenda

- Solution concepts in static games
- Dynamic extensive form games
- Repeated games
- Games of incomplete information

## Group project topics

- Bargaining games
- Canonical games
- Dynamic and repeated games

# Next steps

## Timeline

- course registration closes Fri 30 Jan
- cancellations should be made before Fri 30 Jan
- by **Tue 3rd Feb**: decide on group members and choose project topic
- by **Tue 3rd March**: submit your research proposal

## Your say!

Any Questions or Suggestions?

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[klein.co.uk/GameTheory](http://klein.co.uk/GameTheory)