This site contains documentation on software I am authoring and maintaining for matching problems. In matching markets, supply and demand cannot (or should not) be coordinated by prices, but by other criteria. Prominent examples include personal preferences of market participants in the sharing economy, as well as in education and labour markets, where both sides have to choose each other, i.e. employees cannot just choose their employer, they also have to be chosen (and vice versa).
A major challenge in matching markets is designing allocation mechanisms in such a way that all participants have an incentive to reveal their true preferences. This can prevent individual participants from taking advantage of others through strategic reporting of their preferences, whilst also facilitating the statistical analysis of existing allocation practices, such as the design of gender and minority quotas in labour markets or catchment areas in school choice.
matchingMarkets: Structural Estimators and Algorithms for the Analysis of Stable Matchings, R package version 0.3-5, The Comprehensive R Archive Network, 2018.
Analysis of Stable Matchings in R: Package matchingMarkets. Vignette to R package matchingMarkets, The Comprehensive R Archive Network, 2018.