R package matchingMarkets
Structural Estimators and Algorithms for the Analysis of Stable Matchings.
matchingMarkets R package comes with two estimators:
stabit: Implements a Bayes estimator that corrects for sample selection in matching markets when the selection process is a one-sided matching game (i.e. group formation).
and five algorithms that can be used to simulate matching data:
hri: Constraint model for the hospital/residents problem. Finds all stable matchings in two-sided matching markets. Implemented for both the stable marriage problem (one-to-one matching) and the hospital/residents problem, also known as college admissions problem (many-to-one matching).
iaa: Immediate Acceptance Algorithm (a.k.a. Boston mechanism): First-preference-first algorithm used for school choice in many countries. And Gale-Shapley Deferred Acceptance Algorithm.
sri: Constraint model for the stable roommates problem. Finds all stable matchings in the roommates problem (one-sided matching market).
plp: Partitioning Linear Programme. Finds stable matchings in the roommates problem (one-sided matching market) with transferable utility.
ttc: Top-Trading-Cycles Algorithm. Finds stable matchings in the housing market problem.
sri are based on Patrick Prosser’s n-ary constraint encoding model. They allow for incomplete preference lists (some agents find certain agents unacceptable) and unbalanced instances (unequal number of agents on both sides).
Get started by installing the R software for statistical computing.
To get the latest stable version of the package from CRAN:
Under Linux, the dependency package
gmp requires that you have GNU MP (> 4.1.4) installed, see https://gmplib.org.
To get the most recent development version from GitHub:
install.packages("devtools") devtools::install_github("thiloklein/matchingMarkets") library(matchingMarkets)
or from R-Forge:
install.packages("matchingMarkets", repos="https://R-Forge.R-project.org") library(matchingMarkets)